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strictures of the American Atomic En-
ergy Act of 1946 (the McMahon Act),
which forbade the transfer of American
scientific and technological knowledge
of the atomic weapon to any other
power, Anglo-American nuclear intelli-
gence cooperation nevertheless went
ahead. These two governments used
this intelligence to predict outcomes,
and what proved to be even more suc-
cessful, the detection of Soviet nuclear
weapons testing.
Goodman’s narrative of this effort fo-
cuses on long-distance monitoring, as
well as acoustic, seismographic, and
electromagnetic monitoring of the So-
viets’ nuclear weapons program. This is,
in itself, an excellent insight into the
Cold War nuclear intelligence from
1945 to 1958, an invaluable mirror into
these efforts.
What sets this work apart, however, is
Goodman’s placement of what is essen-
tially one mirror behind another—his
revelation of the strategic implications
of nuclear intelligence-sharing on the
Anglo-American special relationship it-
self, along with the impact of that rela-
tionship on the Soviet Union. To
understand the dynamics involved,
Lewis Carroll’s Through the Looking
Glass is worth recalling, as Alice de-
clares that it is like a huge game of chess
that is being played all over the world.
But what of the Soviet Union, the con-
ventionally understood object of all the
covert intelligence monitoring and de-
tection efforts? Goodman answers this
question in his conclusion. He argues
that while extensive literature exists on
the Soviet threat and the American per-
ception of it, these works often deal
with what he calls an alleged “bomber
gap” and “missile gap.” He states that
“both gaps were figments in the
imagination of the U.S. intelligence
community, based in the main on over-
stating the Soviet potential in order to
procure greater funds for military de-
velopment.” While this is a standard
critique, Goodman applies what he
terms “counterfactual history,” a third
look into the mirror behind the mirror.
Counterfactual history, he argues, “is a
tool that often can be used to great ef-
fect. The Soviet Union, it seems, would
never have seriously contemplated war
with the West. Given the American
atomic arsenal, it is also unlikely that
even if Britain had not developed a nu-
clear deterrent, the Soviet Union would
ever have dared risk war.” Goodman
then measures the capabilities-to-
intentions calculus so familiar to stu-
dents of the Naval War College, as fol-
lows: “In the minds of those who
mattered, Soviet capabilities were inti-
mately linked to Soviet intentions.
Therefore, while the Soviets were with-
out the capability to wage war, their in-
tentions were perceived to be far less
aggressive.”
Goodman has produced a definitive
work, in that it validates the United
Kingdom’s unequivocal commitment to
an independent nuclear deterrent, and
by doing so he has given us a seminal
work, a landmark effort in its devotion
to prodigious research and commit-
ment to truthful inquiry.
MYRON GREENBERG
Defense Contract Management Agency
Aeronautical Systems Division Ohio River Valley
Brannon, Robert. Russian Civil-Military Rela-
tions: Military Strategy and Operational Art. Farn-
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Kremlinologists were noteworthy for
describing decision making in the USSR
as comparable to cats fighting under a
large rug in a dark room—the only
thing the outside world could clearly
and correctly see was the emerging win-
ner of the struggle. Robert Brannon’s
Russian Civil-Military Relations suggests
that while Russia’s transition from au-
tocracy to nascent democracy has of-
fered observers more transparency,
some of the byzantine intrigues remain.
While Brannon summarizes his hypoth-
esis on the evolution of Russian
civil-military relations using political-
science theoretical literature, this book
is all about the three case studies that
Brannon brings to life, using his profes-
sional notes, along with interviews of
the principals and of experts on the
subject. The author was in position to
know many of the study’s protagonists,
serving as the U.S. naval attaché to Rus-
sia from 1998 to 2001. His proximity to
his subjects, however, does not blur his
vision. If anything, his harshest apprais-
als are directed at his closest Russian
counterparts.
Brannon illustrates his understanding
of Russian civil-military relations by ex-
amining the Russian race to Pristina
during the Kosovo conflict (1999), the
second Russian intervention in
Chechnya (1999), and the tragic sinking
of the submarine Kursk (2000). His
writing style enables the casual reader
to follow the exciting plots of the epi-
sodes with relative ease, each building
on the previous story. Some of the juici-
est material is in the footnotes, in which
Brannon recounts personal tales of har-
rowing experiences in exotic Russian
locales.
This is a book about a subject never
widely discussed in the Western press.
During the Bolshevik and communist
eras, the Soviet military was slavishly
controlled and obedient to domineering
and “intrusive” civil authorities, ren-
dering most civil-military discussions
irrelevant. However, the relationship of
Russian political and military leaders
after the fall of the Soviet Union is at
best problematic and at worst threaten-
ing. Samuel Huntington (the famous
American political scientist) held that
for a military establishment to act as a
profession, it must possess expertise, re-
sponsibility, and corporateness.
Brannon argues that the Russian mili-
tary leadership, while often both in-
competent and deceptive, has
consistently held to the belief that Rus-
sia should be suspicious of American
and NATO intentions, whereas the Rus-
sian military itself remains strong and
assertive, possessing the power to influ-
ence international affairs. In other
words, with all its flaws, it is a distinct
professional organization. However, the
author makes a persuasive critique of
Russia’s political leadership in the
1990s. The military adventurism docu-
mented in the three case studies may
have been caused largely by the Boris
Yeltsin administration’s fecklessness
while facing budding national security
struggles. Military men may simply
have been acting as Russian patriots in
the face of a political vacuum.
However, the book comes up short in
two areas. First, because Russia is
unique, it is questionable whether its
experience sheds much light on the de-
velopment of civil-military relations in
other postcommunist societies. Second,
one of the book’s central messages is
that the Russian military is in need of
reform. Yet as the United States has
witnessed over the last decade, terms
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like “reform” and “transformation”
mean different things to different par-
ties. Brannon never makes clear what he
means by his Holy Grail of “reform.”
Brannon sees in Vladimir Putin (and
the Dimitri Medvedev–Putin team) the
political leadership missing in the
1990s. He suggests that the military is
more likely to give its aggressive sup-
port and obedience to decisive nation-
alists who support military reform. This
may be both the good and the bad news
of this provocative study.
TOM FEDYSZYN
Naval War College
Evans, Richard J. The Third Reich at War. New
York: Penguin, 2009. 926pp. $40
This final volume of Richard Evans’s
trilogy on the Third Reich (the earlier
titles being The Coming of the Third
Reich, 2003, and The Third Reich in
Power, 1933–1939, 2005) is a disquiet-
ing masterpiece of scholarship. Al-
though many of the events recounted
here will be familiar to most readers,
Evans accomplishes the seemingly im-
possible by merging both the high poli-
tics (if one can use that term in
describing Hitler’s Germany) with the
best in contemporary social history of
the Third Reich. This sordid story has
never been told so powerfully or from
so many different perspectives. The
voices of the victims, perpetrators, and
bystanders, along with those of the ar-
chitects of the conquest and genocide,
are all heard in chilling detail.
Evans notes that Hitler’s Operation
T-4, his “euthanasia action” program,
directed against disabled, mentally ill,
and incurably sick Germans, laid the
foundation for the more dramatic,
Europe-wide extermination pro-
grams. To relieve the sense of despair
that permeates this book, one
searches for heroes, but they are few
in number. The sporadic camp and
ghetto uprisings were clearly heroic,
as was the resistance by such tiny
groups as the “White Rose” move-
ment. Although the Roman Catholic
bishop Clemens von Galen led the ef-
fort to halt the T-4 program, Evans
notes that the bishop was silent when
it came to the regime’s treatment of
Jews and Gypsies. Hitler learned a
valuable lesson from the T-4 episode:
limit the paper trail and speak in eu-
phemisms when dealing with state-
sponsored extermination programs.
There was, of course, resistance to
Hitler among some members of the
officer corps, men whose sense of
honor led them to recoil from the
atrocities they witnessed in the war in
the East. Another group, composed of
theologians, lawyers, and some social-
ist politicians, known to the Gestapo
as the Kreisauer Kreis (Kreisau Cir-
cle), failed to merge with the military
resisters, thus further diminishing the
already long odds that Hitler could be
deposed.
Unfortunately, more often than not, or-
dinary Germans reveled in Hitler’s early
victories and seemed to endorse, or at
least tolerate, Hitler’s annihilation poli-
cies. The notion that ordinary Germans
were unaware of the atrocities commit-
ted in their name is laughable. For in-
stance, in the fall of 1939 German
officers and enlisted men wrote home
of the incredible “dirt” and “filth” they
encountered among the “subhuman”
Poles; they began to exterminate parts
of the population within days of the
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